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YmTUAL CONSTITUTIONS: 
THE CREATION OF RULES FOR 
GOVERNING PRIVATE NETWORKS 
Michael L Meyerson * 
INTRODUCTION 
Law always lags behind technology. In part, this is inevitable for a 
profession based on precedent, where the common law still reigns after 
nearly 500 years. Of course, the lawyers and judges who argue and 
decide the issues of technology and law are also somewhat responsible; 
legal education does not include basic engineering and electronics courses. 
The result of this myopia has been a frequent misunderstanding of the 
promise of new technology. 
In 1915, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that movies were not 
protected by the First Amendment, but were merely "spectacles, not to 
be regarded. . . as part of the press of the country or as organs of public 
opinion."\ Similarly, one court in 1968 held that cable television was not 
sufficiently "affected with a public interest" to permit local regulation.2 
The court reasoned: "The public has about as much real need for the 
services of a CATV system as it does for hand-carved ivory back-
scratchers. ,,3 
In this age of high-speed computer networks, the nation's legal system 
again seems unprepared. The rapid growth of computer technology has 
left the law far behind. Computers and communications have been 
improving at the extraordinary rate of 25 % a year for two decades.4 
Meanwhile, computing costs have been cut in half every three years since 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., University of 
PeIDlSylvania Law School; B.A., Hampshire College. An earlier version of this article was 
presented at a conference on privaie compuier networks, sponsored by the Columbia Instituie 
for Tele-Information. The author would like to thank Eli Noam for his encouragement and 
thoughtlUlcommen~. 
1. Mutual Films Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915). 
This decision was not overturned until the middle of the century. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495 (1952). 
2. Greaier Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ohio 1968), affd 
sub nom., Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970). 
3. 302 F. Supp. at 665. 
4. Michael Dertouzous, Communications. Computers. and Networks, SCI. AM., Sept. 
1991, at 63. 
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1950.5 What began not long ago as just another ivory back-scratcher has 
suddenly become an omnipresent component of commercial and household 
existence. Ready or not, a legal framework must, and will, be created to 
respond to the introduction of computer networks into the fabric of 
everyday life. 
As the use of private networks grows, the need for rules governing 
private networks will become increasingly acute. Questions of liability, 
freedom and responsibility will be resolved, either based on well-
considered policy or as a haphazard response to a sudden crisis. 
There are three ways in which the behavior of networks might be 
governed in the future. First, the United States Constitution could limit 
those networks that are considered "governmental." Next, for those 
networks characterized as non-governmental, legislatures and regulatory 
bodies may decide to impose a wide range of requirements and responsi-
bilities. Finally, efficiency, necessity and fears oflegalliability inevitably 
will lead many networks to create and develop their own "constitutions," 
to promote the general welfare of their users. 
1. WHAT MAKES A NETWORK "PRIVATE"? 
The determination of whether networks are governed by constitutional 
restrictions and how they should be regulated by the government cannot 
be answered in the abstract. There are simply too many types of 
networks. Further complicating the matter is the fact that, as the late 
Ithiel de Sola Pool noted, "[n]etworks, like Russian dolls, can be nested 
within each other.,,6 
Deftning a network is like trying to hit a moving target. New forms 
of networks are constantly being formed, in reaction to changes in 
technology, regulation and experience. The simplest network is created 
by linking together two computers.7 A private corporation or university 
can create its own network, linking together all of the computers used by 
its employees. 
Networks can also consist of services like CompuServe, Prodigy, and 
America Online. 8 These privately owned networks can offer their 
5. Lawrence Tesler, Networked Computing in the 1990s, SCI. AM., Sept. 1991, at 88. 
6. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 199 (1983). 
7. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ADVANCED NETWORK TECHNOLOGY 5 
(1993). 
8. See, e.g., Peter Lewis, Anarchy, A Threat on the Electronic Frontier, N.Y. TiMES, 
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millions of subscribers a wide range of "products," such as electronic 
mail, bulletin boards, news and games. Other networks, such as Usenet, 
provide access to countless electronic fora for almost any conceivable 
topic.9 
Finally, there are the "networks of networks," most notably the 
Internet. 1O These "backbones" enable users to participate in thousands of 
smaller networks. 
A second factor complicating any constitutional analysis is the degree 
to which a given network is "private." For purposes of this discussion, 
a private network will be defmed as one which is restricted to authorized 
members, as opposed to a "public" network which operates as a classic 
common carrier, essentially accessible to all. Unfortunately, this 
defmition of "private" (as perhaps would any defmition of "private") 
leaves open many questions as to the "private" nature of a "private" 
network. The three major sources of confusion concern the issues of: a) 
whether a governmental entity owns or controls a network; b) whether the 
actions of a non-governmental private network will be deemed to be 
"state action"; and c) whether a non-governmental private network is 
truly "private," in the sense of being able to select whom to exclude. 
A. Ownership of the Network 
The Constitution draws a sharp distinction between the actions of the 
Government and those of the private sector. Whether the requirements 
of free speech, equal protection and due process, for example, will have 
to be obeyed will often tum on the ownership of a facility: is it owned 
by a governmental entity or by non-governmental parties? The govern-
ment will often be constrained by constitutional requirement~ that do not 
apply when the government is not involved. A public (governmental) 
school library, for instance, will have far less discretion regarding 
decisions as to which books to discard than would a private (non-
governmental) school library. 11 
May 11, 1994, at DI. 
9. See MARK GIBBS & RICHARD SMITIl, NAVIGATING TIlE INTERNET 194 (1993). 
10. See TRAcy LAQUEEY, THE INTERNET COMPANION 1 (1993) ("The Internet is a loose 
amalgam of thousands of computer networks reaching millions of people all over the 
world."). 
11. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment limits the discretion of a public school board 
to remove books from a school library). 
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Not all governmental facilities, though, are treated as public fora for 
open discussion. Governmental entities have been permitted to close off 
certain communication facilities to the public. For example, a public 
school can limit an interschool mail system to union messages, while 
excluding mail from a rival union. 12 As the Supreme Court stated, in 
another context, the "State, no less than a private owner of property, has 
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it 
is lawfully dedicated. "13 
Nevertheless, the freedom of government to control its own property 
is limited. While the federal government can decide which charities are 
permitted to participate in a fund-raising drive among federal workers, it 
may not bar a charity due to "a bias against the viewpoint advanced by 
the excluded speakers. "14 Thus, even when the government acts in a 
"private" capacity, it is still limited by the Constitution. Because it is not 
a public forum, though, speakers can be excluded on viewpoint-neutral 
criteria. 
It is evident, then, that a publicly-owned network can still be regarded 
as "private," if access to the network is limited and restricted. Such a 
government-owned, private network would still face the constitutional 
restriction against viewpoint-based discrimination, but would otherwise 
have generally the same discretion to control the content of speech as 
would a privately-owned private network. Conversely, a privately-owned 
network, such as AT&T or Bell Atlantic, can be considered a "public 
network," if it is open to all potential users. The general requirement of 
non-discriminatory access of a common carrier would regulate such a 
non-governmental public network. 
Most networks will not fit these two categories. It will, perhaps, be 
easiest to think of a continuum between the exclusively private and the 
truly public. The vast majority of legal controversies will arise with the 
networks which are somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, used by 
more than just one entity (governmental or corporate), yet not generally 
viewed as common carriers. It is these privately-owned "private 
networks" that pose the newest, and perhaps most difficult, questions 
regarding the appropriate scope of limitations, if any, that should be 
imposed on network owners. 
12. Peny Educ. Ass'n v. Peny Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
13. AdderIy v. State of Fla., 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). 
14. Cornelius v. N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812 
(1985). 
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B. State Action 
Further complicating this question is the concept of "state action," 
whereby certain actions of a non-governmental party are attributable to 
the government, and hence governed by constitutional mandates. If a 
private network were held to be a "state actor," its discretion over how 
to deal with users would be significantly restricted. 15 The most relevant 
constitutional provisions would likely be the First Amendment guarantee 
of freedom of expression, which generally prohibits content-based 
censorship, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection, and 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections against loss of liberty 
and property without due process oflaw. The need for a theory of "state 
action" is based on the fact that the Constitution was only designed to 
restrict governmental behavior. Private parties are governed by laws 
passed by Congress or by state legislatures, but the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment only apply to the government. Thus, a mob 
which prevents you from giving a speech has not violated your First 
Amendment rights. A police officer who wrongfully pulls you off a 
podium, however, is an agent of the city and would be guilty of violating 
your constitutional rights. 
The resolution of a state action questions depends on whether the 
relationship between the government and a private party is such that the 
actions of the ostensibly private actor should be attributed to the state. 
For example, a non-governmental school can discriminate on the basis of 
race without violating the Constitution. 16 However, if a city permits such 
15. The Court faced a somewhat similar inquiry in trying to detennine whether broadcast 
licensees were state actors. There was no majority opinion, but Chief Justice Burger wrote 
for a three-justice plurality that a finding of state action would destroy broadcast journalism: 
[I)t would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of promoting the 
constitutional guarantees of free expression, that the day-to-day editorial 
decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of restraints urged 
by respondents. . . . Journalistic discretion would in many ways be lost to 
the rigid limitations that the First Amendment imposes on Government. 
Application of such standards to broadcast licensees would be antithetical 
to the very ideal of vigorous, challenging debate on issues of public interest. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-21 
(1973) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). By contrast, in the case of a common carrier, such 
as the post office or cable television as a provider of public and leased access, such 
constitutional standards would actually encourage free debate by enabling more speech. 
16. Such a private school may still be subject to statutory and regulatory limitations. Cf 
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding IRS denial of tax-
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a discriminatory school to have "exclusive" use of municipal recreational 
facilities, such use would "significantly enhanceD the attractiveness of 
segregated private schools," and thereby violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 
The state action issue for a particular privately-owned network will 
depend on a variety of factors. The relationship between such networks 
and the government is not only quite complex, it varies for different types 
of networks. The High Performance Computing Act of 1991 has further 
interwoven the Government and private sector. IS In the Act, Congress 
established a super-network, the National Research and Education 
Network ("NREN"), to provide a "test bed" for the next generation of 
high-speed computer networks. 19 
It is not apparent how NREN will relate to the private sector. 20 The 
law specifies that NREN not be a competitor of private enterprises but 
instead should be "designed, developed, and operated in a manner which 
fosters and maintains competition and private sector investment in high-
speed data networking within the telecommunications industry. ,,21 On the 
other hand, it is not clear whether there will be any private competitors 
for NREN. 
By definition, everything NREN does is "state action" since it is 
governmentally created and controlled. The status of both the users of 
NREN and any super-networks that may duplicate NREN's services is far 
from clear. A changing technical environment makes predictions of legal 
conclusions speculative for the simplest legal issues. 
exempt status to discriminatory private schools). 
17. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 569 (1974). 
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5512 (1993). For an excellent summary of the Act, see 
Information Superhighway Bill Sketches Outlines of Ubiquitous Computer Network, Daily 
Report for Executives (BNA), at Cl (Nov. 26, 1991). 
19. See generally Andy Reinhardt, Building the Data Highway, BYTE, Mar. 1994, at 46. 
NREN will be built on an existing network, "NSFNET,» which is run by the National 
Science Foundation. NSFNET is also the major backbone of the Internet. While only five 
percent of Internet's costs are paid for out of the federal treasury, a much larger federal 
outlay seems dedicated to NREN. Over the first five years of its existence, federal funding 
may grow to one billion dollars per year. The actual operating structure of NREN is not 
mandated by the law which established it. Control over NREN is centered in the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, which will coordinate the involvement of many other federal 
agencies. Other agencies include the Department of Defense, the National Science 
Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Departments of Education and Energy, and the National Institute of 
Science and Technology. Steve Higgins, Senate Ponders $1.15B Proposal, PC WEEK, Aug. 
17, 1992, at 39. 
20. Reinhardt, supra note 19, at 46. 
21. 15 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(3) (1993). 
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Unfortunately, the state action doctrine is a labyrinth of competing 
policies and analyses. Its complexities have led one scholar to conclude, 
"[V]iewed doctrinally, the state action cases are a 'conceptual disaster 
area.' "22 
Courts have held in one line of cases that only governmental coercion 
or encouragement of a specific private act will lead to a finding of state 
action: "Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private 
party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those 
initiatives . . . ."23 
In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that a private electric utility's 
termination of service to a customer was not state action even though the 
Pennsylvania Utilities Commission ("P.U.C.") had approved the general 
tariff containing the termination procedures.24 The Court explained that 
neither the existence of "extensive and detailed" regulation nor the 
P.U.C.'s approval of a general tariff would turn a private utility's acts 
into actions of the state.2S The Court noted that the P.U.C. had never 
discussed the specific provision and that "there was no . . . imprimatur 
placed on the practice. "26 The Court did note that: 
It may well be that acts of a heavily regulated utility with at 
least something of a governmentally protected monopoly will 
more readily be found to be "state" acts than will the acts 
of an entity lacking these characteristics. But the inquiry 
must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between 
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so 
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of 
the State itself.27 
22. LAURENCEH. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1690 (2ded., 1988)(quoting 
Charles Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action, n Equal 
Protection, and California'S Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). 
23. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982). 
24. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
25. [d. at 350. 
26. [d. at 357. 
27. [d. at 350-51. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court held that a private club could 
discriminate against African-Americans even though it received one of only a limited number 
of liquor licenses from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, and was subject to detailed 
regulation. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Because the discriminatory 
policy was not mandated by the Board, the Court held that the State's general regulation 
"cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage racial discrimination. Nor can it be said 
to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in the club's 
enterprise." [d. at 176-77. 
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Heavy state funding may not even be enough to turn an enterprise 
public. A private school which taught special-needs students and received 
more than 90 % of its funding from the state was permitted to fire an 
employee for speaking out against school policies, even though such a 
firing might have been unconstitutional had the employer been a public 
school.28 The Court reasoned that the school's fiscal relationship with the 
State should be analogized to that of independent contractors performing 
services for pay, and thus should not result in a fmding of state action.29 
Under the reasoning of these cases, the vast majority of non-govern-
mental private networks using NREN would maintain their private 
character unless their actions were either compelled by the federal 
government or induced by governmental encouragement. Governmental 
regulation and benefits received by the private networks would not turn 
otherwise private decisions into state action. 
However, such an analysis may understate the unique advantage given 
to certain private networks by the Government. That special benefit, 
combined with an intermingling of governmental and private facilities, 
may be enough to support a finding of state action for at least some non-
governmental private networks. 
A series of Supreme Court cases have stressed that, even without the 
government mandating or coercing activity, state action will be found 
when an intertwining between the private and public entities indicates that 
the government, "has elected to place its power, property and prestige" 
behind a challenged private act.30 
For example, the Supreme Court held that a "private" restaurant, 
located in a municipal building, violated the Constitution by its racially 
discriminatory pOlicies.31 The Court based its finding that the restaurant's 
actions were "state action" on a number of factors, including the fact that 
under the lease agreement, the city benefited fmancially from the 
economic effects of the private discrimination.32 The Court concluded 
28. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
29. [d. at 843. 
30. Edmonson y. LeesyilJe Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding use of 
peremptory challenge by private civil litigant to exclude jurors based on race was state 
action). 
31. Burton Y. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
32. [d. at 724 (stating that "profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to, but 
are indispensable elements in, the financial success of a governmental agency"). The Court 
also noted that the land and building were publicly owned, that the building was "dedicated 
to 'public uses' in performance of the Authority's 'essential governmental functions,'" and 
that the restaurant was a "physically and financially integral and indeed indispensable part, " 
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that the local government had neglected its constitutional duties by failing 
to limit contractually the restaurant's discriminatory practices: 
[By] its inaction, the [government] has not only made itself 
a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its 
power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimi-
nation. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position 
of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be 
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. 33 
Like the restaurant in a public building, networks using NREN will be 
physically (or metaphysically) intertwined. Depending on the business 
relationship, the Federal government might well benefit fmancially from 
the actions of the "private" network. If such a network misuses its 
power, by, for example, banishing critics based on the content of their 
speech, it could be argued that the Government is putting its power, 
computing and otherwise, behind the misconduct. If so, the private 
network's actions might be characterized as state action. 
A similar concern led the Court to strike down restrictive covenants 
which barred the sale of homes to "nonwhites. ,,34 Even though the 
covenants were contained in contracts between private parties, the Court 
held that judicial enforcement of those contracts would be unconstitution-
al. The Court concluded: "It is clear that but for the active intervention 
of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, 
petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question 
without restraint. ,,35 
Although the actual covenant did not emanate from the state, and there 
was no evidence that the government encouraged the discrimination, state 
action existed because the government was facilitating the discrimination. 
Likewise, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Supreme Court, 
stated that peremptory challenges of jurors by private civil litigants were 
state action because of the "overt, significant assistance," of state officials 
in the discrimination: 
of the government's plan to operate as a self-sustaining unit. [d. at 723-24. 
33. [d. at 725. 
34. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
35. [d. at 19. According to the Court, the state had "made available to [private] 
individuals the full coercive power of government" to deny buyers, on the basis of race, 
their right to purchase property. [d. 
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Without the direct and indispensable participation of the 
judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the peremp-
tory challenge system would serve no purpose. By enforc-
ing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the court, 'has 
not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has 
elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the 
[alleged] discrimination. ,36 
It could be argued as well that the federal government's infrastructure 
is essential for the larger, more powerful networks. A super-network, 
such as the NREN, provides "overt, significant assistance" which 
undoubtedly enables "private" networks to become economically viable. 
Thus, the government may fmd itself a party to challenged acts of such 
networks, even without active encouragement. 
Certain private networks might also be analogized to company towns. 
The Supreme Court held that even though the streets of a town were 
privately owned, the First Amendment permitted Jehovah's Witnesses to 
leaflet on those streets, because: "Whether a corporation or a municipali-
ty owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical 
interest in the functioning of the community in such a manner that the 
channels of communication remain free. ,,37 In language that could easily 
be applied to private network users, the Court stated that: 
[The residents of company towns] are free citizens of their 
State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make 
decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. 
To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to 
enable them to be properly informed their information must 
be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these 
people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these 
freedoms with respect to any other citizen.38 
The reach of the company town concept was severely restricted when 
the Court held that there was no First Amendment right to petition in 
36. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). 
37. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
3S. ld. at 50S-509. 
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private shopping centers, and distinguished the company town because, 
unlike the shopping center, it had "all of the attributes of a state-created 
municipality. "39 Nevertheless, as networks develop, courts may find that 
they are far more essential for meaningful communication than shopping 
centers. Networks might carry all forms of electronic communication, 
and deprivation of access to a network might indeed impair the flow of 
public information. 
For smaller networks, it is unlikely that state-action will be an issue. 
Such networks appear to be fungible, so that if one network is unsatisfac-
tory, others are available. No single network is essential. However, if 
a bottleneck arises, whereby one or only a few entities control access, this 
issue will become far more significant. If a court fmds that a private 
network has "monopoly power, via economic, physical or natural means, 
or via essential facilities, ,,40 that court might be far more willing to 
conclude that the network's actions are state action. As such, the 
constitutional mandates in favor of freedom of expression and against 
censorship and discrimination would govern the largest private networks' 
decisions. 
C. How Private is Private? 
Another major source of confusion over the term "private" can be 
seen in the concept of a "private" club. Normally, the First Amendment 
permits individuals to select those persons with whom they will and will 
not associate.41 For instance, one court has held that parade organizers 
have a constitutional right to bar others from marching in their parade, 
and that the government would violate the First Amendment if it tried to 
force them to permit others to march.42 On the other hand, a so-called 
"private" club can be prevented from discriminating in its choice of 
39. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 
507 (1976). 
40. Allen S. Hammond, Regulating Broadband Communications Networks, 9 YALE J. ON 
REG. 181, 234 (1992). 
41. See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 
548 (1987) (describing the "right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of 
political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends"). 
42. See New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 
358 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (permitting long-standing sponsor of St. Patrick's Day parade to 
exclude the Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization). But see Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston Allied War Veterans Council, 636 N.E.2d 1293 
(Mass. 1994) (fmding such exclusion would violate the First Amendment). 
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membership when it is large enough to resemble a place of public 
accommodation. For example, it is constitutional for the government to 
outlaw discrimination based on race, creed or sex in any club with more 
than 400 members that provides regular meal service.43 As Justice 
O'Connor has observed, while an organization devoted solely to political 
or religious activity may have full constitutional protection against 
governmental interference, "there is only minimal constitutional protection 
of the freedom of commercial association. "44 
Thus, the government may be able to regulate access to a "private" 
network, if it involves only commercial association, especially if multiple 
firms are involved, or is so large that it loses any plausible claim of 
intimacy and homogeneity. 
In sum, the "private" nature of a "private network" will not be 
resolved until we know the structure of the network system that is 
ultimately created and the path of analysis that is ultimately chosen by the 
Supreme Court. Until then, one hopes that the courts will strive to locate 
that narrow pathway that both limits governmental interference and 
prevents private monopolistic abuses. 
II. WHOSE SPEECH IS IT ANYWAY? 
When a network owner establishes a forum for the speech of network 
users-by creating bulletin boards, for example-wrangling frequently 
exists over two issues: who has the right to determine what speech is 
communicated and who is responsible for illegal speech. Without 
question, no party should ever be held legally responsible for speech 
which it had no power to prevent.4S The harder question comes when a 
network owner tries to retain the right to bar speech it fmds undesirable. 
The legal and policy problems are exacerbated when the network owner 
is unwilling or, for large networks, unable to preview and evaluate all of 
the speech on the network. 
As an initial matter, network owners do have a right to define how 
their networks will be used. There is no sound reason to prevent a 
company from establishing a "family" network if there are other networks 
freely available. Many different types of networks would seem to further, 
43. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
44. Robens v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
45. See, e.g., Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
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not deter, free expression. A danger of hypocrisy seeps in, however, if 
corporate criticism is censored as if it were equivalent to sexually 
offensive material. Confusion, if not charges of false advertising, will 
also await a network that leads users to view bulletin boards as open fora, 
without ensuring that all know that the network considers all speech as 
"its" speech. Ultimately, though, the issue may be decided not on the 
basis of public or corporate policy, but by legal rules that determine who 
should be held responsible for network speech. 
The frrst judicial decision regarding a computer network's liability for 
the communications of its users came on October 29, 1991, in Cubby, 
Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.46 CompuServe is a network that provides its 
subscribers with access to numerous information sources, including more 
than 150 "forums," such as electronic bulletin boards, on-line conferences 
and databases. One forum, the Journalism Forum, is operated by 
Cameron Communications, Inc. ("CCI"). CCI had a contract with 
CompuServe under which CCI "agree[d] to manage, review, create, 
delete, edit and otherwise control the content of the [Journalism Forum], 
in accordance with editorial and technical standards and conventions of 
style as established by CompuServe. ,,47 CCI, in turn, had contracts with 
many electronic publishers, including Don Fitzpatrick Associates 
("DFA"), which publishes Rumorville. DFA's contract required it to 
"maintain ... files in a timely fashion," and stated that "DFA accept[ed] 
total responsibility for the contents of [Rumorville]. ,,48 
On more than one occasion in April 1991, Rumorville published 
unflattering statements about a competing service, Skuttlebut. The owners 
of Skuttlebut sued for libel, business disparagement and unfair competi-
tion. What distinguished this from the usual legal dispute was that they 
not only sued the head of DFA, which produced the material, but also 
sued CompuServe, which carried it. The key issue, according to the 
court, was to decide which print model should be applied to computer 
networks. At common law, anyone who repeated or republished 
defamatory information was as guilty as the original speaker. 49 Thus, if 
Anne said that Bob was a thief, and Carol's newspaper printed the 
charge, Bob could sue Carol for repeating the allegation. 
46. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
47. 1d. at 143. 
48. 1d. 
49. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). 
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Booksellers and newsstand operators, though, are not generally 
characterized as "repeaters" unless they knew, or should have known of 
the defamatory content. so Thus, if David sells Carol's newspaper at his 
stand, David is immune from liability as long as he is unaware of the 
defamation. The reason for this exemption is obvious. To make 
booksellers and newsstand operators liable for everything they sell is to 
require them to be aware of everything they sell. As the Supreme Court 
has stated, "It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an 
approach to omniscience. . .. If the contents of bookshops and 
periodical stands were restricted to material of which their proprietors had 
made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed. "SI 
The court in Cubby ruled that CompuServe should be viewed as an 
electronic newsstand rather than a high-tech newspaper. The court 
reasoned that CompuServe "has no more editorial control over such a 
publication [as Rumorville] than does a public library, book store or 
newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine 
every publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it 
would be for any other distributor to do so. "S2 Accordingly, even though 
CompuServe could refuse to carry a particular forum or publication within 
a forum, "in reality, once it does decide to carry a publication, it will 
have little or no editorial control over that publication's contents. "S3 The 
legal result of the newsstand analogy is that CompuServe would be liable 
only if it "knew or had reason to know" of the statements.S4 Because no 
such knowledge could be proven or implied, CompuServe escaped 
liability on all counts. 
Of course, if the network is not responsible for the publication, the 
focus will shift to the party who actually created the allegedly harmful 
material. ss Such a ruling serves the interest of free communication. If 
networks are not held legally responsible for their users' communications 
networks will not have the same incentive to seek to control and censor 
such communications on the network. The court's decision thus helps to 
50. E.g., Lennan v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
51. Smilh v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959). 
52. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140. 
53. ld. 
54. ld. at 141. 
55. As of Ihis date, Ihere has been no resolution on Ihe merits of Skuttlebut's charges 
against Rumorville. 
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reduce the potential problems of censorship by electronic publishers, 
while maintaining individual responsibility for one's own remarks. 
Unfortunately, network owners and users may find that the court's 
decision does not go far enough to protect freedom of electronic speech. 
This dilemma is illustrated by the crisis that confronted another network, 
Prodigy, which is a joint venture of Sears, Roebuck & Co. and I.B.M. 
Prodigy offers its more than one million subscribers access to numerous 
services, including over 100 electronic billboards. In mid-1991, one of 
the billboards began displaying vicious anti-Semitic messages, including 
statements that stories about the Holocaust were "a hoax," and that the 
extermination of Jews was "good idea. ,,56 The Anti-Defamation League 
of the B 'nai B'rith (" ADL") complained to Prodigy and asked them to 
censor the offending items. At first, Prodigy refused, citing its policy of 
permitting free exchange on its bulletin boards. 
Many found this argument insufficient. Prodigy, after all, had 
previously censored statements of which it disapproved. Prodigy had, in 
fact, advertised itself as a "family-oriented" service, and vowed to screen 
messages both electronically and with a five-person back-up crew that 
would remove any "offensive" statements that slipped through.57 
Previously, Prodigy had removed not only statements of an explicitly 
sexual nature, but also comments criticizing Prodigy for its actions. 
Apparently, the censors at Prodigy felt that corporate criticism was 
"offensive. " 
Given this background, Prodigy's acquiescence towards hate speech 
could easily appear as approval. Prodigy both retained the ability to 
delete messages which it felt were offensive and permitted the anti-Semitic 
tirades to continue. Therefore, the chairman and the director of the ADL 
concluded "that Prodigy did not regard [the anti-Semitic messages] as 
offensive. However, we did. "58 Finally, Prodigy relented, and announced 
that" offensiveness" included statements "grossly repugnant to community 
standards," including, presumably, those of bigots.59 
The Prodigy incident reveals the weakness in the Cubby decision's 
protection for networks. As long as a network retains the power to 
56. Barnaby J. Feder, Toward Defining Free Speech in the Computer Age, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 3, 1991, at E5. 
57. ld. 
58. Melvin Salberg & Abraham H. Foxman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
1991, at A30. 
59. Feder, supra note 56, at E5. 
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censor, it risks being treated, both legally and in the world of public 
opinion, as an electronic editor who concurs with all statements on the 
network. Since CompuServe only avoided liability because it was 
ignorant of the message, it presumably would have been responsible for 
any repetition of the message once it received a complaint. Its refusal to 
censor a statement would then be viewed as an adoption of the statement 
as its own. Moreover, once a network is informed of a problematic 
statement somewhere in its system, it might well be said that the network 
has "reason to know" of the possibility of future similar statements and 
thus should monitor the offending speaker. 
Such a rule would pose a grave threat to the free exchange of ideas on 
private networks. Owners would have to evaluate every communication 
about which they had received a complaint. This problem is not limited 
to libel. Allegations of invasion of privacy, copyright violations and even 
obscenity would force the network owners to use their power of 
censorship. 
To make matters worse, the determination of what is constitutionally 
protected speech and what is illegal speech can be a difficult and 
uncertain legal decision. Risk-averse network owners will undoubtedly 
"steer far wider of the unlawful zone,» in keeping out questionable 
speech.60 Since the speech being silenced will not originate with the 
network operator, the desire to communicate one's own thoughts, which 
can counteract the chilling effect of restrictions on speech, will not deter 
network self-censorship. 
In defending its right to censor offensive material, Prodigy stated that 
it had, by "using its editorial discretion, chosen not to publish . . . 
submissions and other similar material. . .. The First Amendment 
protects private publishers, like the New York Times and Prodigy, from 
Government interference in what we publish. »61 However, any network 
owner will eventually realize the impossibility of trying to censor all 
potentially damaging speech. Prodigy, for example, not only pre-screens 
messages, but also utilizes software to catch numerous expletives and 
otherwise offensive words and phrases.62 Nonetheless, in early 1993 a 
60. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 275 (1964)(citing Speiserv. Randall. 357 
U.S. 513. 526 (1960». 
61. Geoffrey Moore. The First Amendment is Safe at Prodigy. N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 16. 
1990. at C3. 
62. Sandra Sugawara. Computer Networks and the First Amendment. WASH. POST. Oct. 
16. 1991. at A12. 
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Prodigy bulletin-board user was sued for libel and securities fraud for 
publishing negative statements about a small company in which he had 
invested and lost money. 63 The company did not sue Prodigy, but could 
it have? If a court took Prodigy at its word, then the offending comments 
were published as a result of Prodigy's editorial discretion and, like any 
private publisher, Prodigy should be held accountable for abuse of that 
discretion. However, this fmding, combined with the impossibility of 
censoring all network speech, would quickly cause the end of bulletin 
boards and other network fora. 
There are two solutions to this dilemma. Congress could pass a law, 
which would clarify the rule in Cubby and free network owners from 
legal responsibility for any programming they did not produce, unless 
they had notice of actual illegality. In other words, there would be no 
network liability for user speech until a court had found the speech to be 
beyond the protection of the First Amendment. Thus, the determination 
of the legality of the speech would be made by an impartial court, rather 
than a private network, while the party who produced the speech would 
bear the same responsibility as it would in a more traditional medium. 
The most obvious weakness to this proposal is that legislative action is 
difficult to obtain, especially if lawmakers would have to resist the call 
for greater censorship of unpopular speech. 
One hopes that wise judges will make a similar ruling in the course of 
deciding litigation, but legal uncertainty will persist until such cases are 
decided. Also, networks like Prodigy that choose to retain the power to 
exclude messages which they fmd offensive may still be in legal limbo. 
It will not always be easy to discern the line between producing a 
message, which creates legal responsibility for the speech, and merely 
acquiescing in speech when one has the power to prevent it. 
The alternate solution, which may require nothing more than a 
published policy, is for a network to forego all ability to censor communi-
cations in exchange for freedom from liability for the communications of 
others. One example of such a trade-off can be seen in cases freeing 
broadcasters from liability for programming they are required to carry. 
Federal law deprives a broadcaster of all "power of censorship" over 
material required to be broadcast under the "equal opportunities" law. 64 
63. Amy Harmon, New Legal Frontier, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at At. 
64. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988) states that if a broadcast licensee permits a candidate for 
public office to use the station, equal opportunities to use the station must be made available 
to all competing candidates. 
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The Supreme Court ruled that this requirement implies absolute protection 
for broadcasters against state-imposed liability for the material carried.65 
As one court noted in relieving a radio talk-show host of legal responsibil-
ity for statements made by an anonymous caller: "The impact of the 
censorship [if liability was imposed] would not fall upon the broadcaster's 
words and ideas; instead, it would be applied to the opinions and ideas of 
those members of the public who elected to participate in this kind of 
public forum. ,,66 
To avoid repeated litigation and network reviews of all information 
carried on billboard statements, e-mail, video programs and more, 
networks may be willing to agree to carry messages without regard to 
their content. Thus, these networks will be more like public parks, or at 
least common carriers, than similar private publications. Such an 
arrangement might be voluntary. To avoid legal uncertainty, however, 
the choice probably should be embodied in legislation. This would 
replace one editor with thousands, and multiply the electronic voices 
heard. To paraphrase the Supreme Court, such freedom for networks 
from liability would help prevent the danger of shutting off "an important 
outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do 
not themselves" control computer networks "who wish to exercise their 
freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. ,,67 
A useful, if surprising, analogy can be made between this vision of 
modem private networks and the role of printers in colonial America. In 
those days, because printing was still an art that was both expensive and 
not widely mastered, printers performed a vitally different function than 
they do today. Like many contemporary networks, printers viewed their 
job largely as that of preparing the writings of others for mass distribu-
tion. Printers, therefore, would publish diverse points of view, and often 
received criticism for their willingness to publish undesirable material. 68 
In the 1730s, Benjamin Franklin was an influential Pennsylvania printer. 
On June 10, 1731, after enduring complaints about the writing he had 
printed, Franklin wrote his own defense, entitled "An Apology for 
Printers." He argued that printers should be not be treated as proponents 
of all that they publish: 
65. Fanners Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
66. Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 557 (Wyo. 1976). 
67. N.Y. Times Co. v. SuJIivan, 367 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
68. See, e.g., POOL, supra note 6, at 16 ("The printing press was a bottleneck where 
copies could be examined and controlled."). 
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[Printers] chearfully serve all contending Writers that pay 
them well, without regard on which side they are of the 
Question in Dispute. . .. Being thus continually emloy'd 
in serving both Parties, Printers naturally acquire a vast 
Unconcernedness as to the right or wrong Opinions con-
tain'd in what they print; regarding it only as the Matter of 
their daily labour: They print things full of Spleen and 
Animosity, with the utmost Calmness and Indifference, and 
without the least Ill-will to the Persons reflected on .... 69 
147 
Franklin continued that printers should not be regarded as approving 
that which they print, and then warned of the consequences of condemn-
ing printers for the work of the writers: 
It is . . . unreasonable what some assert, "That Printers 
ought not to print any Thing but what they approve;" since 
if all of that Business should make such a Resolution, and 
abide by it, an End would thereby be put to Free Writing, 
and the World would afterwards have nothing to read but 
what happen'd to be the Opinion of Printers .... 70 
The printers of the eighteenth century controlled access to the primary 
means of mass communication then available.71 Private censorship by 
those printers would have resulted in a severe restriction on public debate. 
The largest networks may be in a similar situation at the conclusion of the 
twentieth century. It may be even more unreasonable for these networks, 
which carry millions of messages, to carry only those they approve. If 
such a situation occurs, "an End would thereby be put to Free [Electronic 
Communication] and the World would afterwards have nothing to read but 
what happen'd to be the Opinion of the [Network owners]." 
69. Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for Printers, PENN. GAZETTE, June 10, 1731, 
reprinted in LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 4-5 
(1966). Franklin, never one to hold himself to too high a standard, freely admitted that he 
had often refused to print material that would "countenance Vice, or promote Immorality 
... [or] as might do real InjuI)' to any Person .... " ld. 
70. ld at 6. 
71. See, e.g., POOL, supra note 6, at 16. 
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III. PRIVATE NETWORK CONSTITUTIONS 
A. General Discussion: The Purpose of a Constitution 
To a nation, a constitution serves many different functions. On its 
most practical level, a constitution describes the ways in which those in 
political control may exercise their power. Next, a constitution can 
provide the framework for the rights of the individuals living within the 
country. It can delineate the line between public responsibility and 
private autonomy. Ultimately, though, a constitution defmes the very 
character of a nation, directing what sort of country it wants to be, and 
is likely to become. 
In many ways, constitutions for computer networks will operate in the 
same way. They will delineate the decision-making functions, outline the 
rights of network users, and both reflect and create a vision of what type 
of society we want within, and without, the universe of the network. 
Assuming requirements are not imposed either by the courts or by the 
federal and local legislatures, networks will need to create their own. 
Because of the variety of private networks, it is impossible to create any 
one-size-fits-all document. Certain fundamental principles can be 
ascertained, however, based on the current state of and future plans for 
private networks, coupled with a look at the basic principles of a free 
society. 
One of the more overlooked aspects in current discussions of 
broadband networks is that a new technology does not always require new 
rules. Just as it is an invasion of privacy to read someone's Post Office-
delivered mail, it is an invasion of privacy to read his or her e-mail 
without permission. Just as a fast-food restaurant can prevent employees 
from receiving personal phone calls at work, an employer can prevent 
employees from using a company network for personal affairs. 
Thus, some of the questions involving the next generation of private 
networks were answered long before there was a Silicon Valley. If a 
network is small-for example, an entirely in-house operation-there 
seems to be no logical reason why the network should be viewed any 
differently from traditional workplace equipment. If an employer wants 
to limit the access of certain employees to parts of the network, he or she 
should be able to do so. Newsday, concerned that its reporters were 
spending too much company time on e-mail, decided to alter its computer 
software to keep reporters from sending e-mail messages. Reporters were 
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only able to receive messages, but their editors continued to be able to 
send e-mail.72 This may be a demeaning way to treat one's staff, but 
restricting reporters in this fashion is not analytically dissimilar from 
issuing a memo telling staff not to use copiers for personal items. 
New thinking may be necessary when the technology poses new risks 
or creates novel opportunities. For example, if an ever-increasing amount 
of personal information is carried over networks, the threat to personal 
privacy also increases. Moreover, if it is easier to tap into a computer-
ized database than the files inside a doctor's office, greater precautions 
are needed. 
Privacy must be protected. There is both an economic value in private 
information (as evidenced by the sale of mailing lists) and a First 
Amendment interest in the dissemination of truthful information. 
Nonetheless, there is an overriding interest, both personal and societal, 
that a private citizen retain the ability to ensure that his or her private 
communications will not be subject to electronic intrusion. The growth 
of computer networks creates new threats to what has been termed "the 
right most valued" by civilized persons, "the right to be let alone. »73 
Networks must either ensure privacy or effectively inform all users 
that their communications are not private. Any contractual agreement 
permitting a network owner, or some other entity, to gather or dissemi-
nate personal information should be a knowing waiver. No "negative 
option," whereby a user waives privacy protection without affirmatively 
requesting it, should be permitted. As a matter of general principle, users 
should not be charged extra for routine privacy protection.74 
For those networks that include numerous participants, privacy must 
be guaranteed even further. Absent a significant threat to the network's 
viability or purpose, the right to send a message privately must be 
preserved. Encryption should be permitted. Each disseminator of 
information should have the right and ability to control who receives his 
or her messages. 
The battle over encryption is not merely one between a network owner 
and its users. The United States Government, concerned that encryption 
72. Lee Sproull & Sara Kiesler, Computers, Networks and Work, SCI. AM., Sept. 1991, 
at 116, 119. 
73. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
74. COMMON CARRIER WEEK, Aug. 10, 1992 (discussing testimony of Marc Rotenberg, 
head of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, at forum conducted by the 
National Commission on Libraries and Information Science). 
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may threaten national security, proposed a system which would have 
effectively made any encrypted message "decodeable" by the National 
Security Agency. This proposal, which would have limited the ability to 
guarantee the privacy of one's electronic communications, was withdrawn 
in July 1994.75 
B. Example: Anti-Competitiveness 
One area where individual autonomy may conflict with the public 
interest involves anti-competitive behavior. The desire to enhance one's 
own economic standing at the expense of one's competitors may lead to 
inappropriate, if not illegal, use of the private network. The danger of 
anti-competitive behavior increases, as does the likelihood of antitrust law 
violation, where multiple large firms use a network to the exclusion or 
detriment of their competitors. 
The antitrust laws view joint anti-competitive activity far more 
critically than unilateral anti-competitive action. The Supreme Court has 
held that concerted conduct violates the law if it merely restrains trade, 
while individual firm conduct is illegal only if it threatens monopoliza-
tion.76 In other words, an "unreasonable" restraint of trade may be 
permissible if imposed by a single firm, but not by two firms acting 
jointly. 
In one of the first cases involving computer networks, airline computer 
reservation systems ("CRS") were held not to violate the antitrust laws.77 
In this case, American Airlines and United Airlines had each created their 
own CRS ("SABRE" for American and "Apollo" for United). Each had 
charged competing airlines a substantial fee for any of their flights booked 
through the system.78 The court found the arrangement legal because the 
CRS neither eliminated nor threatened to eliminate competition in the air 
75. See, e.g., Elizabeth Corcoran & John Mintz, Administration Steps Back on Computer 
Surveillance, WASH. POST, July 21, 1994, at AI. 
76. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774-77 (1984). In 
particular, Section 1 of the Shennan Antitrust Act bars combinations in "restraint of trade, " 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), while Section 2 prohibits any "attempt to monopolize." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (1994). 
77. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), affg In 
re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 
1988). 
78. The Department of Transportation requires each CRS owner to charge its airline 
customers a uniform rate. 14 C.F.R. § 255.5(a) (1992). In 1991, American Airlines charged 
$1.75 per booking. 
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transport market. Moreover, each CRS was not treated as an "essential 
facility" because it was created by a single firm: "A facility that is 
controlled by a single firm will be considered 'essential' only if control 
of the facility carries with it the power to eliminate competition in the 
downstream market. ,,79 
Such uriilateral power is not often found by courts. Only in extreme 
cases, such as the only local producer of electrical power refusing to sell 
to wholesalers in order to eliminate competition in the retail market, will 
there be the ability to eliminate competition.80 
In the early 1980s, AT&T was found to have misused its control over 
an essential facility by refusing to allow MCI to interconnect with its local 
distribution facilities. 81 The court described four factors that determine 
if there is an antitrust violation by the unilateral owner of an "essential 
facility": a) It is controlled by a monopolist; b) there is a practical 
inability to duplicate facilities; c) the use of the facility to a competitor 
has been denied; and d) it would be feasible to permit use of the facility. 82 
Another court has stated that a fmding of "essential facility" requires a 
showing that "severe handicap" will result if the competitor is denied 
access. 83 In sum, a court will likely only fmd unilaterally-owned 
"essential facilities" if there is a showing that they involve "natural 
monopolies, facilities whose duplication is forbidden by law, and perhaps 
those that are publicly subsidized and thus could not practicably be built 
privately. "84 
Certain larger networks, backbones or mid-levels, may qualify as 
"essential facilities." This determination is always case-specific, and 
courts will examine the practical reality as well as the theoretical 
possibility of constructing a competing network. As one court stated, just 
because Proctor & Gamble can bypass the local telephone loop, it hardly 
means that residential consumers have the same ability. 85 
79. 948 F.2d at 544. 
80. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973). 
81. MCI Ccmrnunications Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
82. ld. 
83. Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(finding magazine not essential for sale of nutritional supplements) (citing Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979». 
84. ld. at 569 (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 680-
81 (Supp. 1988». 
85. California v. F.C.C., 905 F.2d 1217, 123 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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Any private network operated by more than one competitor will face 
the heightened risk of violating the antitrust laws. If, for example, there 
are networks controlled by a few large players in an industry, anti-
competitive network decisions may make the network owners liable for 
treble damages. Any action that is unjustifiable except as an attempt to 
harm competition may be considered an "unreasonable" restraint of trade. 
If, for example, several banks combined to create a network for the 
purpose of clearing checks, any exclusion of competing banks might 
subject the network owners to liability. Similarly, rules that disadvantage 
disfavored competitors would also be suspect. 
In terms of procedures, traditional constitutional notions of due process 
would not apply (absent a fmding of state action). Nonetheless, 
fundamental fairness in how the network treats its users would be 
necessary to prove "reasonableness." Procedures for resolving network 
disputes should be agreed upon, and made known to all users. Moreover, 
all similarly situated users should be equally treated. Before a small 
competitor is kicked off a network, the owners should be able to establish 
that a clearly enunciated, well-publicized rule was violated, that the 
offender was given a chance to explain its side of the story, and that 
similar previous violations were similarly punished. 
By contrast, if a single bank creates such a network, it would have far 
greater discretion in treatment of its competitors. Unless it met the strict 
standard for "essential facilities," with the key inquiry being whether 
competitors could reasonably create a similar network, everything short 
of an attempt to monopolize would be permitted. On the other hand, 
blatantly anti-competitive action, especially if coupled with benign treat-
ment of other competitors, might reduce the court's tolerance for 
unilateral action. 
CONCLUSION 
At some point, courts will need to resolve the question of how to 
apply an eighteenth-century constitution and even older common law to 
the communications technology of the twenty-first century. 
Only by examining the various functions served by each network, and 
the interplay of government regulation and funding, will a logical, 
efficient and fair application of timeless principles be possible. 
In the best of all worlds, truly private networks would create their own 
private constitutions for the betterment of all the network users, and 
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complex issues will be addressed well in advance of any crisis. Unfortu-
nately, some private network owners will not make these decisions ahead 
of time because they will assume that their discretion will be forever 
unlimited. However, like those who die without seeing the need to write 
a will, these network owners may fmd that important decisions are 
ultimately made by a judge, and that the final dispositions are far different 
from those they would have preferred. 
